

The Essential Role of Credible Correct Simulation in Assuring the Safety of America's Nuclear Stockpile

Foundation 02

**Dr. David Crandall** 

Defense Programs, NNSA, DOE October 22, 2002

### NNSA Mission

Strengthen United States security through the military application of nuclear energy and by reducing the global threat from weapons of mass destruction.







### The Nuclear Weapons Complex

#### **The Production Complex**



Pantex Plant



Y-12 Plant



Kansas City Plant



Savannah River Site

#### The Defense National Laboratories and Test Site



Sandia



**Nevada Test Site** 




Los Alamos



Lawrence Livermore

## Stockpile Stewardship R&D Strengthening Science-Based Methods

Theory and Simulation





#### U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile\*



\*Active stockpile only, does not include the W84

> B61-7/11 B61-3/4/10 Non-strategic

B-52, B-2

Air to Surface

Air Force

9/85, 11/97

Strategic Bomb

**B83** 

B-52, B-2

LLNL & Sandia

Air to Surface

Air Force

9/83

TLAM-N Warhead ALCM/ACM

W80-0/1

SSN Attack Submarine B-52, B-2

LANL & Sandia

Underwater to Surface Air to Surface

Navy, Air Force

3/84, 2/82 5

Labs

**Primary use** 

**Description** 

**Delivery system** 

**Service** 

Date entered stockpile

Air Force

Bomb

F-15, F-16,

**NATO Tornado** 

LANL & Sandia

Air to Surface

10/79, 8/79, 8/90

Strategic

LANL & Sandia

#### U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile





**W78** 



**W87** 





,	W62	2

**ICBM** Warhead

Minuteman III

LLNL & Sandia

Surface to Surface

Air Force

Date entered 4/70 stockpile

**Description** 

**Primary use** 

Labs

**Service** 

**Delivery system** 

ICBM Warhead

Minuteman III

LANL & Sandia

Surface to Surface

Air Force

9/79

**ICBM Warhead** 

Peacekeeper

LLNL & Sandia

Surface to Surface

Air Force

7/86

SLBM Warhead

Trident I (C4)
Trident II (D5)

LANL & Sandia

Underwater to Surface

Navy

11/78

SLBM Warhead

Trident II (D5)

LANL & Sandia

Underwater to Surface

Navy

6/89

6

## Pillars of Science Converging on Certification



#### What do we need to do?

- Ensure the safety, security, reliability and effectiveness of the stockpile without testing:
  - Conduct annual assessments for certification
  - Detailed understanding of weapons physics and materials aging
  - Conduct surveillance, predict and find problems, develop solutions
  - Refurbish weapons well before aging degrades safety and reliability
- Design, develop, manufacture, and certify new weapons, in response to new national requirements.
- Respond rapidly and decisively to changes in the security environment.
- Maintain timely ability to conduct nuclear test, if required.

#### **DETERRENCE THROUGH:**


- **✓** Being capable
- √ On-going, visible surveillance/certification
- **✓** Demonstrated capability to respond to new requirements

Leading Edge Technology
in
Modeling & Simulation
is
our Answer


## Our M&S Investment Program: ASCI




# ASCI will Deliver 3-D Codes Capabilities



1. Certification of primary and secondary yield



3. Certification of weapon components in hostile nuclear environments



4. Manufacturability of refurbished components



2. Certification of weapons in normal

environments



5. Evaluation of safety of nuclear weapons in accident environments


### Simulation Requires a Large Supporting Infrastructure Platforms



**Problem Solving Environment/Post Processing** 



**Distance & distributed** computing



simulation


Material & physics models



**Verification & validation** 

# Newer, more powerful platforms are in the pipeline













### One-billion-atom molecular dynamics simulation movie

Multiscale modeling allows us to envision new roles for computational materials science

#### The Future?

Stewardship: unprecedented resources and dependence on simulation computing.

These capabilities and their value will drive other endeavors to similar solutions